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PARTY AUTONOMY AND REGIONAL HARMONIZATION OF
RULES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Elizabeth Shackelford*
In the last half of the twentieth century, the trend towards “world-wide
harmonization of trade law” has increased steadily with the globalization of
economies and the corresponding increase in transnational commerce.1
Throughout this period, efforts have emerged to unify and harmonize
international commercial law in order to promote international trade.2  The
two primary ways this was pursued during the twentieth century were
unification of choice-of-law rules and harmonization or unification of
substantive rules.3
Today efforts are being taken in a new area of harmonization:  the
procedural rules of arbitral institutions.  Although the UN adopted the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in 1976,4 which have increased uniformity in
ad hoc arbitration,5 institutional arbitration rules still vary dramatically even
within regions.  The recent adoption of the new Swiss Rules of International
Arbitration,6 however, is sign of a change.  Already an important center for
international commercial arbitration,7 Switzerland has only become a more
attractive choice for parties looking for predictable dispute resolution by
providing one uniform set of procedural rules for the several Chambers of
Commerce and Industry in Switzerland.
As of January 1, 2004, the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Basel,
Bern, Geneva, Ticino, Vaud, and Zurich each incorporated the Swiss Rules of
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International Arbitration (“Swiss Rules”) as their applicable institutional rules
for the purposes of international arbitration.8  The adoption of the new Swiss
Rules reveals not only the benefits of regional harmonization of arbitral rules,
but also the difficulties that harmonization can cause in the transitional period
for parties that consented to a particular set of institutional rules now
dramatically altered.  Where relevant provisions of the Swiss Rules
substantively differ from provisions of the rules applicable prior to 2004, the
rights and obligations of the parties under a contract may be substantially
altered without the consent of the parties.
Article 21(5) of the Swiss Rules is a primary example of a provision now
applicable which can cause drastic changes to arbitration proceedings on
contracts made prior to the application of the Swiss Rules.9  This article
provides an arbitration tribunal with jurisdiction to hear set-off defenses “even
when the relationship out of which this defence is said to arise is not within
the scope of the arbitration clause or is the object of another arbitration
agreement.”10  While similar provisions were present in at least three of the
Chambers’ rules applicable to international arbitration prior to the Swiss
Rules,11 the Geneva Rules, a popular choice worldwide for international
arbitration, did not provide such extensive jurisdiction.12  Article 21(5) is a
powerful jurisdictional article which, when chosen by the parties, provides the
authority for one arbitral tribunal to hear all disputes between the same
parties, which in some cases may indeed provide the most efficient resolution
of disputes.13  However, Article 21(5) now has the power to supercede
agreements between the parties to arbitrate separate disputes elsewhere even
in cases where parties could not have imagined its application based on their
original agreement.  The adoption of the Swiss Rules has now imposed this
provision on parties which, given the choice, may never have agreed to grant
such broad jurisdiction to one tribunal.14  Furthermore, parties in this situation
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are unlikely to have anticipated the possibility of such a change as this
provision is novel in international arbitration.15
This paper explores the conflict that arises between the basic arbitration
principle that party autonomy is paramount in conducting arbitration, and the
idea that arbitral institutions must be free to alter and improve their arbitration
rules to promote uniformity and keep up with advancements in the field.
Indeed, given the trend towards unification in international arbitration,16
parties choosing institutional arbitration should take into account the
possibility of rule harmonization when drafting arbitration clauses.  While
Article 21(5) is a current example of how growing uniformity of arbitration
rules may leave parties victim to provisions they may never have consented
to, it is only one example of a problem likely to be reoccurring as other
institutions join the trend towards uniformity.
This note focuses on the general problem of the tension between party
autonomy and the importance of rule harmonization.  The first section
addresses the principle of party autonomy, specifically regarding choice of
applicable procedural rules to apply to disputes arising out of a contract.17
The second section discusses the conflicting general rule that, where a set of
rules referred to in an arbitration agreement has been amended since the time
of contracting, the current amended rules are applicable to subsequent
disputes.18  The third section focuses on the idea that the adoption of a new set
of consolidated rules is something more than a mere amendment of the
institutional arbitration rules.  This section looks to the experiences of arbitral
institutions in the wake of German Unification and the breakdown of the
former Yugoslavia, wherein the trend was to incorporate material changes to
arbitration only insofar as they promoted the parties’ will and intent at the
time of contracting.19
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The note concludes by presenting a solution in the form of a compromise,
whereby a substantial change in the rules of an arbitral institution should
require an inquiry into the actual intent of the parties at the time of
contracting, but only if the change in the rules substantially affects the rights
of the parties, and the parties neither could have anticipated such a change nor
would have likely agreed to it.  In light of the move towards greater uniformity
in international arbitration, however, parties should contract in anticipation of
the possibility of rule harmonization by including provisions to account for
significant changes in the applicable arbitration rules, thereby avoiding these
conflicts from the start.
I.  THE PRIMACY OF PARTY AUTONOMY
The authority of arbitral tribunals comes solely from agreements between
parties.20  As arbitration only exists as a result of party consent, the parties’
choice of arbitration rules cannot easily be replaced by the unilateral decision
of the arbitral institution.21  Thus, great consideration must be made of party
intentions and expectations as a tribunal only has authority to hear disputes if
the parties intend that it do so.22  Furthermore, in addition to the general
principle for respecting party autonomy, the New York Convention23 and
UNCITRAL Model Law24 also explicitly require respect for the parties’
choice of procedural provisions.  In the case of the New York Convention,
where this choice is not respected, an arbitral award can be denied
enforcement in the courts.25  As a result, the implications of marginalizing the
parties’ choice of arbitration rules are not merely in the violation of general
principles but could in fact result in the unenforceability of an award.26
The authority that parties grant to tribunals is in the form of jurisdiction
over particular disputes.  One method of conferring jurisdiction on an arbitral
tribunal is to include an arbitration agreement or clause in a contract between
parties.  An arbitration agreement acts as evidence of the parties’ consent to
2006] PARTY AUTONOMY AND REGIONAL HARMONIZATION OF RULES 901
27. LEW ET AL., supra note 20, at 100.
28. ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 248 (4th ed. 2004).
29. LEW ET AL., supra note 20, at 411-12.
30. Id.
31. EMMANUEL GAILLARD, The Role of the Arbitrator in Determining the Applicable Law, in THE
LEADING ARBITRATORS’ GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 22, at 185, 199.
32. W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERC IAL ARBITRATION:  CASES, MATERIALS
AND NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 712 (1997).
33. LEW ET AL., supra note 20, at 413.
bestow jurisdiction on a tribunal to decide particular disputes, and one must
look to the agreement to determine the extent of jurisdiction that the parties
agreed to grant.27  Because this grant of jurisdiction is voluntary, arbitration
tribunals are limited to the scope of jurisdiction specified by the parties.28
Parties choose to subject disputes to arbitration because they want a
neutral and consensual method of dispute resolution.29  Furthermore, by
choosing an arbitration institution at the outset of the agreement, parties can
avoid uncertainty and ensure predictability and fairness if a dispute does arise
out of the agreement.  Parties generally determine which agreements, and
which disputes under those agreements, to subject to arbitration based on what
will best serve the mutual interests of the parties.  The ability to choose
arbitration, and how the arbitration will be conducted, provides parties with
the opportunity to construct a mutually beneficial arrangement to which both
parties will voluntarily agree.
However, if the tribunal fails to respect the will of the parties by
exceeding the mandate entrusted to it, these benefits are lost as the jurisdiction
exercised may be outside the scope of what the parties bargained for and
would voluntarily have chosen.  If parties are unable to rely on arbitral
tribunals to respect the jurisdictional boundaries set by the parties, the benefits
of predictability and certainty will be lost, and parties would lose the incentive
for choosing arbitration.  Thus, in order to uphold the role that arbitration
serves in the international commercial realm, arbitration tribunals must
determine the parties’ intent and act within that scope.30
The fundamental principle that party autonomy underlies arbitration is
recognized now by nearly all international arbitration laws, rules, and
conventions.31  Many agreements between parties today include arbitration
clauses with an explicit choice of law, and, in keeping with the principle of
party autonomy, the parties’ choice of law is “invariably” applied by
arbitrators.32 The parties’ freedom to choose what law will govern their
dispute is also confirmed in most international arbitration rules.33  This
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freedom to choose the governing law is a logical extension of party autonomy
to agree to submit to a favorable method of dispute resolution.  Indeed, “few
principles are more universally recognized in private international law” than
the principle permitting parties to choose the governing law for their
agreements.34  Parties are able to better control the dispute resolution process
by selecting appropriate and favorable laws to apply to their dispute, and are
thus able to avoid being subjected to inappropriate or unfavorable laws at a
later time.35
Although the right of parties to choose the substantive law applicable to
their dispute is “undisputed,”36 there is some recognition of limitations on the
parties’ choice of procedural rules.  Where mandatory public policy or
statutory restrictions applicable to arbitration exist in the law of the place of
arbitration, those provisions will apply to the dispute even where the parties
selected a different procedural law to apply.37
However, beyond applicable mandatory provisions of the arbitral situs,
which will only alter the parties’ choice of law where they directly conflict,
the general liberty of parties to select procedural law to govern their disputes
is widely recognized.  The parties’ broad freedom to choose the procedures
that govern their arbitration has become fundamental to international
commercial arbitration today.38  Indeed, this particular freedom is recognized
in the New York Convention,39 UNCITRAL Model Law,40 the Swiss Law on
Private International Law, and national arbitration statutes in many
jurisdictions.41  Furthermore, even where mandatory rules may come in to
limit the parties’ explicit choice of procedural rules, as parties to international
agreements have the freedom to also select the location of arbitration,42 they
can ensure that favorable mandatory provisions apply as well by careful
selection of the arbitral location.
By stating which procedural rules are applicable to a dispute within an
arbitration clause in a contract, parties express their common will and intent
for how the arbitration will be conducted.  The principle of party autonomy
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requires that this common expressed intent not be disregarded except in
exceptional cases.43  Often an international convention that is directly
applicable to the dispute, such as the New York Convention, will require the
arbitral tribunal to respect the parties’ freedom to choose the governing
rules.44  However, even where no applicable convention requires this, tribunals
generally draw upon the principle of party autonomy and look to the parties’
selection regardless.45  Indeed, the primary duty of an arbitration tribunal is to
determine the parties’ intent and give effect to that intent.46  Thus, where the
parties have an agreement laying out the manner of resolving disputes, the
consensual nature of arbitration demands that the manner in which they have
chosen to resolve their disputes be respected in every way possible.
II.  INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE EXTENT OF CONSENT TO
CHANGES IN THE CHOSEN RULES
As a general rule in international arbitration, where a set of rules
implicated by an arbitration agreement has been amended between the time of
contracting and commencement of arbitration, the amended rules are
applicable to the dispute.47  This principle is deemed not to violate party
autonomy because parties choose institutional rules to apply to their dispute,
and an institution is free to, and in fact is expected to, update its arbitration
rules over time.48  Furthermore, the parties have the option at the time of
contracting to state in specific language that they want the institutional rules
applicable at the time of contracting to be the governing arbitration rules for
future disputes arising out of that contract.49  However, unless this choice is
made clear within the arbitration agreement, this intention will not be imputed,
and it will be assumed that the parties intended for the most up-to-date version
of the rules to apply.50  This general principle may not sufficiently protect the
will of the parties where the change in rules is greater than a mere
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amendment,51 so consideration may be necessary in those situations to
determine which provision should apply.
At the time of contracting, parties to an agreement can delineate the
manner of arbitrating disputes in a variety of ways.  Parties can either
“direct[ly]” confer powers on the arbitrators by “agree[ing] expressly upon the
powers they wish the arbitrators to exercise,” or “indirect[ly]” by agreeing to
arbitrate “according to rules of arbitration, whether institutional or ad hoc.”52
If the parties specifically provide the parameters of a tribunal’s jurisdiction
and the manner of arbitration within the agreement, little room remains for
altering the parties’ initial decision.  If the parties choose to indirectly confer
powers on a tribunal by choosing arbitration in accordance with a specific set
of institutional rules, they are exposed to a greater degree of uncertainty as the
rules they relied on may be drastically amended prior to the time disputes
arise.
Nevertheless, despite the potential uncertainty, parties continue to
routinely opt for institutional arbitration rather than provide the specifics of
arbitration procedures within arbitration agreements.  Institutional arbitration
has a number of benefits, beginning with the sheer ease of referring to the
rules of an existing arbitral institution as opposed to the exhaustive exercise
of delineating the details of the procedures within an arbitration agreement.
Furthermore, institutional arbitration offers the benefit that the rules “have
proved to work well in practice” and undergo revision periodically “to take
account of new developments in the law and practice of international
commercial arbitration.”53  Thus, parties do not choose institutional rules
despite the fact that they may change, but in hopes that they will be developed
over time to keep up with current trends in the area.  Not only should parties
expect that changes in the applicable arbitration rules might be made prior to
disputes arising, but they are “entitled to expect that institutional rules will be
reviewed, and if necessary, revised at regular intervals.”54  In fact, one of the
basic requirements that parties look for in choosing an arbitral institution is
that the rules of the institution are regularly “altered to reflect” changes in the
practice of international commercial arbitration, “both nationally and
internationally.”55
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Disputes can arise many years after the conclusion of an arbitration
agreement, so both the parties and the institution itself benefit from the
application of updated rules.  Whereas parties to an agreement may find more
modern rules beneficial, the predictable application of one set of updated rules
is imperative for arbitration institutions.  Because “[p]rocedural provisions can
easily become out of date and so become incapable of implementation,”
arbitral institutions must be in a position to alter their rules accordingly.56  If
parties to any dispute could demand that the rules in force at the time of
contracting apply, arbitral tribunals could be subjected to having to apply any
number of variations on the institutional rules in a given period.  Such
expectations would be difficult to fulfill and inefficient as standards would
have to be reevaluated with every dispute based on what was current at the
time of contracting.
This consequence could provide a disincentive to institutions regularly
updating their procedural rules, which would hinder the evolution of
international commercial arbitration as a whole.  Additionally, if an institution
were to fail to update its rules so as to leave them unchanged from the rules
to which the current clients agreed, the institution would no longer be a viable
professional institution as its procedures become out of date, thereby making
it more difficult to effectively conduct arbitration.57  Therefore, to benefit
current and future clients, arbitration institutions, and the evolution of
international arbitration generally, a reference to institutional rules in an
arbitration agreement must be understood to implicate the application of the
rules current at the time of arbitration.
The principle that the applicable institutional rules are those current at the
time of arbitration is well entrenched in international arbitration.  It is
explicitly provided for in the texts of various institutional arbitration rules.
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules of Arbitration state,
“Where the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration under the Rules, they
shall be deemed thereby to have submitted ipso facto to the Rules in effect on
the date of commencement of the arbitration proceedings unless they have
agreed to submit to the Rules in effect on the date of their arbitration
agreement.”58  Similar provisions can be found in the Rules of Arbitration of
the London Court of International Arbitration59 and the International Dispute
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Resolution Procedure of the American Arbitration Association.60  While such
provisions generally do allow parties to expressly contract otherwise, the de
facto rule is that the rules current when arbitration proceedings begin will
apply.61
Even when the applicable arbitration rules do not include a provision
stating specifically that the applicable rules to apply to a dispute are those in
effect at the time of arbitration, this principle is still followed.  It is generally
accepted that, even without a provision in the rules providing this standard,
“When the parties refer in their agreement to arbitration rules of an institution
and this institution has amended its rules at the time of commencement of the
arbitration procedure, the rules in force at the time of commencement . . . will
be applicable, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.”62  This was the
position of the ICC even before the amendments of 1998 which added the
paragraph explicitly stating this principle.63
This concept has also been reflected consistently in a number of court
decisions in various jurisdictions.64  According to the Queen’s Bench Division
(Commercial Court) of Great Britain, “the code incorporated is that in force
when the time for invoking and acting on the procedural provisions concerned
arises.”65  Furthermore, the type of change to the rules does not matter.  In a
case in Hong Kong, the judge, admitting that the new rules were indeed “more
‘liberal’ than those they replaced,” stated that “[t]he fact that the arbitral
institution chosen by the parties has improved its rules between contract and
arbitration is not sufficient to justify refusing enforcement” of an award made
under the new rules.66  Therefore, the parties, having consensually chosen
institutional rules to govern future disputes, are expected to bear the risk of
any changes to that institution’s rules prior to commencement of arbitration.
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An analogy can be drawn to disputes which parties have consented to
bring before a court of a particular forum.  Like arbitration clauses, choice of
forum clauses involve the consensual choice of the parties to subject
themselves to dispute resolution according to the procedure of a particular
forum.67  When forum selection clauses are incorporated into agreements and
a dispute is brought before a court in the selected jurisdiction, the procedural
rules that apply are clearly those currently in effect rather than those that were
in effect when the parties first chose the forum.  The practical considerations
for courts, as for tribunals, require that the applicable rules governing
procedure be those which the court is in the practice of applying at that time.
In accordance with the principle of party autonomy, parties are able to
specify at the time of contracting that future disputes be governed by the
institutional rules in force at the time of contracting.68  It is generally
understood that if the parties intended for the outdated rules to apply to future
disputes, “they could have so provided.”69  Because such specification must
be made in order for the original rules to apply, the party arguing for the
application of those rules generally has the burden of proving that this was
what the parties originally intended.  Thus, if “the parties have not used clear
enough words to contract out of the prima facie construction” of clauses
incorporating institutional arbitration rules, then the applicable rules will be
those at the time of arbitration.70
III.  CAN PARTY CONSENT BE IMPUTED WHEN A CHANGE TO THE RULES IS
MORE THAN MERE AMENDMENT?
While it is well settled that the amendment of institutional rules after the
time of contracting will not alter the application of the rules current at the time
of arbitration to the proceedings on a dispute, replacing institutional rules with
unified regional rules may be a different situation.  Although parties may be
said to have accepted the possibility of periodic amending of institutional
rules,71 a wholesale replacement of those rules by a newly developed set of
rules for a region is not so foreseeable.  Therefore, in light of the central role
which party consent plays in international arbitration, it is possible that a
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different standard should apply where the subsequent change is so great that
party consent to such a change cannot reasonably be imputed.
Although some limited case law does exist suggesting that the nature of
a change in the rules is immaterial as to the issue of applying only the updated
rules,72 this authority is both sparse and unconvincing in relation to the
application of dramatic new provisions such as Article 21(5) of the Swiss
Rules.  When these unanticipated provisions become applicable to a dispute
due to the adoption of a new set of rules by an institution, the primacy of party
autonomy in arbitration should require a tribunal to be more considerate of the
parties’ likely intentions.  Indeed, in historical instances of significant and
unforeseen changes to arbitral institutions, respecting party intentions has
been the primary concern.
Using the experiences of arbitral institutions in the wake of German
reunification and the collapse of Yugoslavia, this section shows how the
promotion of party will and intent at the time of contracting was the focus of
how changes were incorporated into subsequent arbitration proceedings.73
This approach is not unforeseen in efforts to respect parties’ intent in
resolution of commercial disputes as it is similar to how various jurisdictions
deal with the question of consolidation of multi-party and multi-contract
claims.74  The focus, in each of these situations, is the promotion of party
intent and autonomy.  However, taking such a case-by-case approach with
regard to regional harmonization, as is done with multi-party and multi-
contract claims, would be an obstacle to the very goal of uniformity
generally,75 and of the Swiss Rules in particular,76 as it would greatly hinder
the efficiency and predictability of arbitral proceedings, and disputes would
continue to arise from agreements made prior to the Swiss Rules for years to
come.
While little authority exists as to what happens when a set of arbitration
rules are replaced by another set through regional consolidation of rules, as
occurred with the Swiss Rules,77 the experience of arbitral institution
succession in recent European history can be instructive.  Although it is
certainly true that the adoption of uniform regional arbitration rules is hardly
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the same situation as the historical breakdown or unification of entire state
structures, it is also true, as mentioned above, that a sweeping effort at rule
harmonization is different from mere rule amendment by an institution.  The
examples of German Reunification and the breakdown of Yugoslavia are
discussed, not as parallel situations, but as instructive experiences from which
the international arbitration community can glean fundamental principles to
be applied in other situations of unexpected change.
With German Reunification in 1990, the Arbitration Court at the Foreign
Trade Chamber in Berlin, which was the only international arbitration
institution in the German Democratic Republic, was declared dissolved by its
members who simultaneously founded the Association for Promotion of
Arbitration and transferred all of the powers of the old institution to the new.78
Although some appellate courts in Germany affirmed the arbitration clauses
referring to the old institution as valid consent to arbitrate under the new
institution, the highest German court, the Federal Court of Justice in
Karlsruhe, ruled that such clauses were invalidated by dissolution of the
institution to which they gave authority.79  According to the Karlsruhe court,
“The legal status granted by means of the arbitration agreement . . . is not
transferable to another organization without agreement of the contracting
parties.”80  A Brussels court came to the same conclusion, that the authority
in an arbitration clause was not transferable without consent of the parties,
based on the determination that there was not sufficient continuity between the
two arbitration courts.81
This reasoning has been attacked by many, but the weakness exposed is
that it does not sufficiently respect the will of the parties.  Arguably, having
the disputes determined through arbitration under the new institution, which
is functionally almost uniform to the old institution, would be more in line
with the parties’ intent than resolution by ordinary courts.82  Thus, following
either the reasoning of the Karlsruhe court or that of its critics, one cannot
assume that parties to an agreement entrusting authority to an arbitral
institution are necessarily bound by changes imposed by that institution after
the agreement is made.  Rather, the will and intent of the parties must be the
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key in determining how to apply an arbitration agreement following such
changes.83
Similar problems occurred with the collapse of the Yugoslav federation
in the early 1990s.  Many arbitral clauses throughout the region referred to the
Foreign Trade Arbitration Court (FTAC) in Belgrade, which operated under
the auspice of the Yugoslav Chamber of Economy.  Open hostilities during the
early 1990s made compliance with such agreements by parties outside of
Serbia unattractive if not impossible.84  According to the Zagreb High
Commercial Court in Croatia, arbitration clauses referring to the FTAC no
longer had legal effect because the Yugoslav Chamber of Economy now
existed in a changed form, but even if it had not changed, it was now a foreign
arbitration institution.85  Given this major change in the circumstances of the
FTAC, no basis existed for assuming that parties would have accepted
arbitration clauses incorporating foreign arbitration institution.86
The decision of the Croatian court reflects a primary concern with
respecting the original intentions and expectations of the parties at the time of
agreement.87  Similarly, the Karlsruhe court in Germany prioritized party
consent and intent over determinations made by the arbitral institution as to
subsequent rights of the parties to arbitration agreements.88  Even with the
criticism of the Karlsruhe decision, the issue was not whether or not to look
to the parties’ will when dealing with institutional change, but how best to
fulfill the parties’ will.  If indications exist suggesting that the parties would
not have agreed to arbitrate under the changed conditions anyway, no basis
may exist for binding the parties to those changed conditions.89  However, as
long as the factors on which the parties relied still exist despite changed
circumstances, binding the parties to those changes will not infringe on party
autonomy.90  By utilizing this standard, arbitral tribunals can stay within the
bounds of their mandate as intended by the parties, and party autonomy is
protected even in light of unforeseen circumstances.  This is the standard that
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must be applied when any significant changes have occurred following an
arbitration agreement that significantly affect subsequent arbitration.
The considerations suggested above are not unfounded in everyday
arbitration determinations.  Some commentators suggest that consideration of
the intent of the parties at the time of contracting is necessary to ensure that
significant changes in circumstance after contracting do not wrongfully
infringe on party autonomy.  Parties generally choose to submit their disputes
to a particular arbitral institution based on a number of factors, including a
specific set of arbitration rules, reputation of the institution, and enforceability
of the award where enforceability would occur.91  If one of these factors or
other major factors were to change following completion of the parties’
agreement, some commentators suggest that the change would be significant
enough to require a query into whether or not the parties would have agreed
to arbitration under the new terms.92  Where the difference between what the
parties originally submitted to under their agreement and what the parties are
subjected to under subsequent changes is that significant, consent to those
changes cannot be assumed based on the earlier agreement.93  In the case of
Article 21(5) of the Swiss Rules, recent commentary suggests that, despite the
general principle that the rules current at the time of arbitration apply
regardless of changes subsequent to contracting, a tribunal may have a basis
for “revisiting the old rules” if the new rules contain a provision entirely
unexpected by the parties.94
In accordance with basic arbitration principles, when a material change
occurs in the rules selected by the parties to govern arbitration on an
agreement, party autonomy must still be respected, so the question becomes
whether or not the parties would have agreed to arbitration in accordance with
those changes.95  Indeed, the principle that the rules applied by the arbitral
tribunal must not be contrary to the parties’ reasonable expectations based on
the consensually chosen terms of the original agreement96 affirms the
importance of this consideration.97  As discussed above, the tribunal may
apply arbitration rules that have been changed since the agreement, or even a
separate set of arbitration rules if they now apply under the terms of the
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agreement, but this should only be permissible to the extent that the altered
rules conform to the parties’ intent and reasonable expectations as expressed
in the arbitration agreement.98  If, however, the factors on which the parties
relied in their choices are still present even with the changes, so that the
parties’ intent would not be hindered by application of the changed rules, they
may be deemed properly applicable.99  Only by utilizing this condition of
adherence to the original intent and reasonable expectations of the parties can
the application of significantly altered rules be exercised in accord with the
basic principles on which arbitration is founded.
CONCLUSION
A move towards greater uniformity of procedural rules in institutional
arbitration would be advantageous both for institutions and for parties
engaged in international commercial arbitration.100  However, the benefits of
increased predictability that result from increased uniformity and
harmonization of international arbitration rules must not come at the cost of
party autonomy in the transitional period.  As the very basis for arbitration is
party autonomy,101 the original intentions of the parties should not be
sacrificed in the event of unforeseen changes.  Parties must still be able to rely
on the choices made during contracting, within reasonable expectations.  To
ensure that party autonomy is not sacrificed, an exception must be made to the
default rule that the currently applicable procedural rules automatically apply.
When an arbitral institution adopts a new set of rules encompassing
substantially different provisions, consideration should be given to the parties’
reasonable expectations and intentions at the time of contracting, and new
provisions which negatively impact those expectations and intentions should
not be applied in subsequent disputes.
